RECENT CASES
Income Taxation-Surrender of Life Interest in Trust-Consideration
Received Treated as Return of Capital-Loss Deduction Allowed-[Federal].-The taxpayer was the income beneficiary forlifeof a testamentary spendthrift trust. Three years after acquiring this interest she surrendered it for
$55,000 to the remainderman who thereby obtained an unqualified title to the
property which had formed the corpus of the trust. In her federal income-tax
return the taxpayer treated the surrender as a sale of a capital asset and reported
a long term capital loss arising out of the surrender. The loss was computed by
subtracting the $55,000 from the lump-sum value of a hypothetical annuity
returning a yearly income equal to 4 per cent of the trust corpus for a period
equivalent to the life expectancy of the taxpayer at the time of surrendering her
life interest.' The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the claim of
loss, maintaining that the whole $55,000 was ordinary income taxable in full to
the taxpayer. The Tax Court sustained this position.2 On appeal to the Circuit
Court of Appeals, held, that the surrender of a life income interest in a trust for
consideration is a sale of a capital asset and, accordingly, the taxpayer is entitled to -a capital-loss deduction for the loss arising out of the transaction.
Judgment reversed, one judge dissenting. McAllister v. Com'r of Int. Rev. 3
This case presents, in a comparatively unfamiliar setting, the recurring problem of distinguishing for purposes of federal income taxation between income
and capital or, more narrowly, receipt of income and return or conversion4 of
capital. The importance of this distinction in the existing income-tax structure
is indicated by the wide divergence between the results reached by the majority
and minority opinions in the Circuit Court: the majority treats the consideration received for surrender as tax-free and as giving rise to a capital loss deduction, while the minority regards the consideration as fully taxable income.
Economists have recognized that income and capital are not completely
separable concepts but are two interrelated aspects of the same economic values.
Capital is the value of revenue producing property or of property which can be
exchanged for that which produces revenue; while income is the value of the
revenue produced by property. In this relationship, capital is the value of
anticipated future revenue, and the revenue itself is income when it is produced.
The federal tax statutes have not expressly incorporated this view of income
I This procedure is authorized by the Internal Revenue Bureau. I.T. 2076, C.B. 111-2,
p. 18 (1924).
2 Beulah

Eaton McAllister, 5 T.C. 714 (I945).

3 157 F. 2d 235 (C.C.A. 2d, 1946).
of capital" is used in the text in the sense of changing the form of a capital
investment, e.g., from ownership of land to ownership of cash or stocks.
4 "Conversion
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and capital; the fact is that the tax acts have never attempted to delineate
between these two correlative terms in a direct or categorical fashion. In dealing
with income-tax problems the courts have had to work out the line between
receipt of income and return or conversion of capital in particular situations.
To a large extent the courts in performing this function have been guided by
both the views of economists and popular conceptions about income and capital.
The majority opinion in the McAllister case agrees with two other circuit
court decisions in classifying the disposal for consideration of a life-income
interest in a trust as a sale or exchange of a capital asset.$ This classification was
made largely on the basis of several Supreme Court cases, which were viewed as
precedents. In Blair v. Com'r of Int. Rev. 6 the Supreme Court treated the
gratuitous assignment of a life income interest in a trust as an assignment of
"present property, alienable like any other, in the absence of a valid restraint
upon alienation."' 7 Later in Harrisonv. Schaffner' the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the Blair doctrine, but refused to treat a gratuitous assignment of income for a
term of years out of a life interest as a transfer of property, since the trust
beneficiary in the long run retained substantial control over the disposition of
income. Both of these cases were concerned with whether trust income produced
after the transfer of a beneficial income interest was to be taxed to the donor or
the donee; in this context the conclusion that a life-income interest in a trust is
property (or capital) signifies that the income is to be taxed to the donee.
Neither case presented the issue, involved in the McAllister situation, of whether
any taxable income arises out of the transfer itself since both dealt with gratuitous assignments. 9
The problem of classifying consideration received upon a sale of a right to
income was treated in Hort v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 0 the Supreme Court holding
s Allen v. First National Bank and Trust Co., 157 F. 2d 592 (C.C.A. 5th, 1946); Estate of
Bell v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 137 F. 2d 454 (C.C.A. 8th, 1943).
6300 U.S.5 (1937).

7Ibid., at 13. As used by the court, the term "property" may be taken as synonymous
with the term "capital" as defined in the text.
'32 U.S. 579 (I94I); cf. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. I12 (194o), where the owner of a

negotiable bond was held taxable on interest coupons detached shortly before their due date
and given to his son.
9Judge Frank in his dissenting opinion in the McAllister case relies on the fact that the
legislative history and policy behind the capital gain and loss provisions (§ 117) are distinct
from those pertaining to the section defining gross income (§ 22). The capital asset provisions
were intended to encourage the disposition of certain capital ihvestments by exempting a
percentage of the gain upon sale from taxation. Therefore the classification of a life income
interest as "property" in the Blair case did not determine whether an identical classification
would be consistent with the legislative purpose when § i7 was in question. While this argument may distinguish the Blair and McAllister cases, it should be noted that a determination that a life income interest is not a capital asset still leaves unanswered the basic problem
of whether consideration received upon the sale of such an interest should be treated as return of capital plus gain from the sale of property not subject to the benefits of the capital
gain provisions or as accelerated receipt of ordinary income.
'0313 U.S. 28 (1941).
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that a lump-sum payment received by the lessor in return for surrender of his
right to enforce a long-term lease was taxable income. The Court stressed the
fact that the lessor retained his income-producing property and that the leasesurrender payment represented the difference between the rental that would
have been received under the lease and that which reasonably could be anticipated for the remainder of the lease period. In effect, the lump sum was part of
the income that otherwise would have been received as rentals under the original
lease. Since the lessor retained the income-producing property, the tax had to
be levied upon the lump sum if that "accelerated" portion of the rentals were
ever to be taxed as income rather than as gain or conversion of capital. In the
McAllister case, the life beneficiary possessed only the right to future income,
and she surrendered her entire source of income. Unlike the Horl situation,
there remained after the surrender an undiminished income from the trust
corpus upon which a tax could be imposed.
When right to income is separated from ownership of income-producing property, that right by itself has an immediate capital value based upon the present
value of the anticipated revenue, and the immediate capital value of the incomeproducing property is correspondingly decreased. For example, the immediate
capital value of a long-term coupon bond is exactly equal to the present
value of the'face amount of the bond at maturity plus the present value of the
aggregate of future interest payments represented by the coupons. If the
coupons are detached from the bond and assigned, a large portion of the immediate capital value is transferred with them and the immediate value of the
bond is decreased by the identical amount. In other words the detached interest
coupons have a capital value separate from that of the parent bond. If an assignment of future income from property is for a term of only a few years, the portion of the capital value affected by the income assignment may be insignificant;
but it becomes a substantial factor in a transfer of income from property for a
term measured by a relatively long life expectancy. The remainderman in the
McAllister case obtained by the surrender the full interest in an asset worth
about $ioo,ooo where previously he had a partial interest valued at approximately $37,ooo. Applying the foregoing analysis to the entire transaction, it
might be said that the life beneficiary of the testamentary trust received at the
time of the testator's death a legacy equal to the then present value of the
anticipated income payments, while the remainderman received a legacy equal
to the then present value of the right to obtain the corpus at the end of the life
estate.
Under a tax system which fully recognized the capital aspect of a right to
income, the life-income beneficiary of a trust might be given the privilege of
deducting a return of capital from the income received each year and be required to treat as income only those receipts in excess of the initial capitalized
value of his interest. The remainderman might then be considered as realizing
taxable gain or income based on the difference between the capital value of his
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interest at the time of acquisition and the value of the corpus at the end of the
life estate.,, If the income interest in a trust is thought of as being a legacy or
gift consisting of the capitalized value of anticipated future payments, it assumes the characteristics of an annuity. Both are capable of being capitalized
by an identical method as funds from which a steady periodic flow of income will
result while the fund is depleted. The income tax in effect now treats the annuitant as receiving a return of capital until the aggregate amount received exceeds
the original investment. 2 The Treasury regulations find little difficulty in regarding the sale of an annuitant's right to income as a sale of capital, since the
seller merely changes the form of his income-producing source and becomes able
to reinvest elsewhere.'3 If a life estate were treated as a capitalized legacy or
gift, the same results would follow when the life tenant in the McAllister case
surrendered her interest, exchanging her right to income in the trust for a cash
sum which could be reinvested elsewhere. In comparing a life interest and an
annuity it is to be noted that, unlike the situation in the Hort case, neither the
sale of an annuity or the surrender of a life interest affects the total amount of
income produced by the annuity or the trust corpus.
In taxing the revenue produced by the corpus of a trust the tax laws, however, have not treated the payments to a life-income beneficiary as including a
return of capital.'4 The refusal to treat the income beneficiary like an annuitant
apparently finds its basis in tax policy. Unlike an annuity, which is a contract
right for certain payments, the interests of the income beneficiary and remainderman are traditionally viewed as property derived through a division of the
complete bundle of rights which constitute the trust property. Administration
of the tax laws is simplified by requiring that the tax upon the income produced
by the corpus be chargeable to only one such divided property interest, and the
income beneficiary seems to be the most practical choice. It is at least doubtful
whether a typical testator would feel that he is giving a life tenant capital as
distinguished from pure income. The presumed understanding of the testator
may be important since the courts have given weight to popular concepts of
income.'s The income beneficiary, moreover, will be able to pay the tax out of
"M
Maguire, Income Taxes on the Realization of Future Interests, 31 Yale L. J. 367 (X922).
While the income beneficiary is not allowed to treat any portion of trust income as a return of
capital the Bureau of Internal Revenue in the past has given one-sided recognition to the
income and capital relationship set forth in the text by attempting to tax the remainderman
on the appreciation in value of his interest due to the erosion of the life income interest.
- Internal Revenue Code, § 22(b)(2), 53 Stat. zo (1939), 26 U.S.C.A. § 22(b)(2) (1940).
'3 Treas. Reg. iiz, § 29 .22(b)(2)-3 (1946); cf. Alcy Sivyer Hocker, 36 B.T.A. 659 (i937).
Z4 The Internal Revenue Code charges the full tax upon trust income to the income beneficiary with certain exceptions where the trust is revocable or the income is for the benefit
of the grantor. Internal Revenue Code, § i6t(b), 53 Stat. 66 (X939), 26 U.S.C.A. § x6I(b)
(1945). It further prohibits any deduction for a decrease in the value of a life or terminable
interest due to shrinkage through lapse of time. Internal Revenue Code, § 24(d), 53 Stat. 17
(1939), 26 U.S.C.A. § 24 (d) (i94o).
ISSee Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. i6i, i66 (1925); United States v. Oregon-Washington R. &
Nav. Co., 251 F. 211, 212 (C.C.A. 2d, 1918).
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the income received. The remainderman, on the other hand, might not possess
sufficient funds to pay a large tax upon realizing the appreciation in value of his
interest or even the information necessary to make a return. The problem would
be especially magnified where the remainder interest was contingent. These considerations support the present system of imposing the full income-tax burden
upon the income beneficiary during the continuance of his estate.
When the life-income interest is assigned for a consideration, however, the
foregoing factors are not relevant in determining whether the life tenant should
be treated as receiving income or as converting his capital; but they remain
pertinent in respect to apportioning the tax on trust income between the
purchaser and remainderman.
Upon buying a life income interest, the purchaser might be thought of as
putting himself in the position that the vendor life income beneficiary formerly
occupied and accordingly be held to the tax liabilities that go with that position.
The tax position of the purchaser is similar to that of a person who buys stock
with dividend on. When the dividend is paid, the price of the stock in a frictionless and otherwise stable market decreases by the amount of the dividend.
But a purchaser of stock with dividend on must treat the dividend as income
when it is received even though the value of his stock drops and, from an economic standpoint, receipt of the dividend is a return of capital to such a purchaser. x6 The treatment of the dividend as income is justifiable in that the diviend is commonly thought of as being income to somebody, and it is administratively inexpedient to charge the tax on that income to anyone but the immediate
recipient. The purchaser of a life income interest stands in a similar position and
for the same reason might be charged with the full income and not be allowed
any deduction for a return of capital.17 No hardship is placed upon the purchaser
by taxing trust income to him in full provided he enters into the transaction
knowing that such would be the tax consequences of his action. 8
It must be conceded that the above argument is an expression of a minority
view. The prevailing view permits the purchaser of a life income interest to
obtain a return of capital out of income. Original life beneficiaries are not permitted such a return of capital since they have not acquired a cost basis as has
the purchaser of such an interest. The basis of the trust corpus has been transferred to the trustees or to the remainderman and one of them will gain the
x6

See note,

i4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 281 (1947).

17If the remainderman purchases the life income interest he may be fully taxable upon the
income received from the property, acquiring a basis equal to his original remainder basis plus
the purchase price for the income interest.
18The Supreme Court reversed a lower court decision holding that a widow was entitled to
deduct the value of her dower interest, surrendered in exchange for the life income interest in
a testamentary trust created by her husband, before being taxed upon receipt of trust income.
The Court held her taxable in full upon the trust income, stating, "For reasons satisfactory
to herself, she expresses a desire to occupy the position of a beneficiary and we think she
should be so treated." Helvering v. Butterworth, 290 U.S. 365, 370 (1933).
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advantage of that basis and be permitted to recover tax free the amount of
capital represented by it.' 9
Tax-dvoidance possibilities in connection with the trust income in the
McAllister situation are not present if the tax is to be charged to whoever is the
actual recipient of the income. The only serious tax-avoidance problem appears
to lie in the creation of artificial capital losses through intra-family dealings.
But the courts have held that losses in family dealings are not entitled to full
recognition without some proof of their bona fide character.20 Where a life estate
in a family trust is surrendered the proof required might be a demonstration
that there has been an economic decrease in the value of the life interest apart
from that diminution resulting from the passage of time. There can be such an
economic decrease only when the prevailing interest rates, hence capitalization
rates, increase or when there is a shrinkage in the anticipated income from the
trust corpus. In the absence of this kind of proof a court might conclude that
the difference between the sale price and the basis (after reflecting the passage of
time) represented a gift rather than a loss. But where the transaction is at arm's
length, as apparently it was in the McAllister case,2 there seems no more reason
to question the claim of a loss than in any other situation where the sale of
property reflects an adverse difference between basis and sale price.
Even though computing the basis of a life income interest by capitalization
can be justified on the economic theory previously considered, the question
remains whether it is authorized under Section 113(a) (5) of the Internal Revenue Code. This section provides that the basis of property in the hands of a
devisee shall be the fair market value at the death of the testator . 2 Basis of an
undivided property interest, once established, never changes so long as the
property remains in the hands of the same person.23 The Treasury regulations

establish a formula for allocating to remainders and other divided property
interests a proportionate share of the basis of the undivided interest, the proportion being dependent upon the value of the divided interest, which in the case
of a life estate turns on the life expectancy of the beneficiary.24 But in no place
does the statute specifically authorize any apportionment of the basis of the
undivided interest. It may be argued that in the absence of a specific statutory
'9 See Estate of F. S. Bell, 46 B.T.A. 484, 489 (1942), rev'd on other grounds, 137 F. 2d
454 (C.C.A. 8th, 1943); cf. Edward Wolfe, 7 T. C. 715 (1946); Floyd Shoemaker, 6 B.T.A.
1145 (1929); Elmer J. Keitel, I5 B.T.A. 903 (1929).
20 Treas. Reg. iii, § 29.23(e)-i (1946); Evans v. Rothensies, 14 F. 2d 958 (C.C.A. 3 d,

1940).
21The taxpayer had obtained a decree surcharging the remainderman, who was also a trustee. The parties were 6ngaged in litigation concerning the trust at the time of the surrender.

"Acquisition" as used by the Internal Revenue Code refers to the death of the testator.
Helvering v. Reynolds, 313 U.S. 428 (i94i).
'3 The adjusted basis will be affected by depreciation, depletion, and amortization provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
24Treas. Reg.

III,

§ 29.i13(a)(5)-i (f) (1946).
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provision, any apportionment is unauthorized. Such a conclusion might indicate
that Congress, by failing to provide a basis for a life income interest, regarded
the proceeds received from the sale of such an interest as income which is
taxable in full. In view, however, of the continued existence of the Treasury
regulation without Congressional objection, the apportionment procedure appears to be authorized by implication.25
Assuming the validity of the Treasury regulation establishing a proportionate
share of the basis of the undivided property interest as the proper basis for
divided interests, there may remain a controversy over proper application of the
formula. In the McAllister case the taxpayer contended that the proportion of
the whole basis allocable to her should be computed by using her life expectancy
either at the time her interest was acquired or at the time of its surrender.26
The commissioner concurred with the latter view in the event that the transaction was regarded as involving the sale of a capital asset. It is apparent that
while the basis of the undivided property interest remained fixed, the taxpayer's
interest in fact decreased in value as her life expectancy diminished. If the proportion of the whole basis assignable to the divided interest Is computed from
the time of its acquisition, there would be an inevitable loss upon disposition
due to the lapse of time, which would obscure ascertaining the gain or loss resulting from the fluctuations in the economic value of the income interest. Such
a result would defeat the purpose of Section ii3(a)(5) of the Code, which does
not recognize changes in value caused merely by exhaustion through the passage
of time.27

Even if it is agreed that the surrender of a life income interest in trust
property is a sale of a capital asset, it does not necessarily follow that a loss or
surrender is deductible as a capital loss. Under Section 22(a) of the Code all
income, from whatever source, is included in computing taxable income unless
the taxpayer can point to a specific exemption or qualification.28 The provisions
of Section 17 of the Code limit the percentage of capital gain that is included
in arriving at taxable income. As a result of the combined force of Sections 22
See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. io6, 120 (i94o); Augustus v. Com'r of Int. Rev.,
118 F. 2d 38, 43 (C.C.A. 6th, X941), cert. den. 3x3 U.S. 585 (1941); Com'r of Int. Rev. v.
Laguna Land and Water Co., ix8 F. 2d 112, 114 (C.C.A. 9th, 1941). An additional argument
2

may be made that while Congress has impliedly authorized the Treasury regulation, it applies
only to those divided interests which will eventually ripen into full title to the whole property. Since the purpose of § 113 of the Internal Revenue Code is to prevent recognition of
gain or loss realized as a result of postponed possession of full title or control of the property,
it might be argued that the section does not apply to an interest, such as an income beneficiary's, which never can eventually give possession of the whole property. Treas. Reg. Iii,

§ 29.113(a)(5)-I(b)(I)

(1946).
26 The Court adopted the former method, using the life expectancy of the taxpayer at the
time of acquisition in First National Bank and Trust Co. v. Allen, 65 F. Supp. 128 (Ga., 1946),
aff'd 157 F. 2d 592 (C.C.A. 5 th, 1946).
27 Treas. Reg. Iii, § 29.ir3(a)(5)-i(b)(i) (1946).
2S

See Helvering v. Clifford, 3o9 U.S. 331, 337 (i94o); Helvering v. Midland Mutual Life

Ins. Co., 300 U.S. 216,

224 (1937).
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and 117, all capital gains are included in whole or part in computing taxable
income. On the other hand, deductions from income rest on legislative grace and
are not allowed unless the taxpayer can find specific statutory authorization.29
Authority for various loss deductions is found in Section 23 of the Code. When
a loss falls within both Sections 23 and 117, the express cross-reference in Section 23(g)(I) indicates that a deduction will be allowed under Section 23 as
limited by Section 117. No authority for loss deductions is contained in Section
117, 30 so that a loss falling within that section alone is not allowed.31
In the McAllister situation it appears that no authority exists for claiming a
loss deduction unless the surrender of a life income interest falls within the terms
of Section 23(e) (2) which permits deduction of losses incurred in "any transaction entered into for profit." In general, this provision has been construed to
mean that a transaction involving the sale of property is one entered into for
profit if the property had been acquired32 and held33 for the business purpose of
producing revenue 34 and was sold at a reasonable price under circumstances not
indicating a gift.35 This construction was developed in cases in which the taxpayer owned and disposed of an undivided interest in assets of a type commonly
regarded as ordinary business investment property. In the absence of any evidence pointing in another direction, a profit motive is the only motive that
29 See Helvering v. Inter-Mountain Life Ins. Co., 294 U.S. 686, 689 (1935); New Colonial
Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 44o (i934); Charles Ilfeld v. Hernandez, 292 U.S. 62, 66

(19.34).
30

The section refers to "recognized" capital losses. Recognition of losses is dealt with in

§ 23. G.C.M. 16793, C.B. XV-2, p. 162 (i936) (discussing the legislative history and purpose
in the use of the term "recognized" in the Revenue Acts of 1936 and 1934); Juliet B. Hamilton, 25 B.T.A. 1317 (1932). Section H17 further defines capital losses as those taken into ac-

count in computing net income, while § 21 defines net income as gross income minus the
deductions allowed under § 23. Eli Winkler, 2 T.C. 735 (1943), aff'd sub nom. Winkler v.
Nunan, 143 F. 2d 483 (C.C.A. 2d, 1944).
3x Morgan v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 76 F. 2d 390 (C.C.A. 5th, 1935); S.M. 3024, C.B. IV-',
p. 12 (1925); G.C.M. 16793, C.B. XV-2, p. x62 (1936) (residential homes). Juliet B. Hamilton,
25 B.T.A. 1317 (1932) (paintings). Lihme v. Anderson, i8 F. Supp. 566 (N.Y., 1936) (yacht).
DuPont v. United States, 28 F. Supp. 122 (Del., 1939) (stallion). Industrial Trust Co. v.
Broderick, 94 F. 2d 927 (C.C.A. 5th, 1938), cert. den. 304 U.S. 572 (1938) (annuity). S.M.
4941, C.B. V-i, p. 6i (1926) (automobile). A per-curiam decision with Judge Frank sitting
said, "Section 22 remains the section which tells us what shall go into gross income; § 23,
that which tells us what deductions are permissible ..... [There is] the argument that
§ 23(e" is not the only section which allows the deduction of losses. We think that it is."
Winkler v. Nunan, 143 F. 2d 483 (C.C.A. 2d, i944).
32 Heiner v. Tindle, 276 U.S. 582 (1928); Weir v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 1o F. 2d 96 (i94o);
9
Plant v. Walsh, 43 F. 2d 256 (D.C. Conn., 1930).
33 Lloyd Jones, 39 B.T.A. 531 (1939); W. H. Moses, 21 B.T.A. 226 (1930).
34 This rule is modified when a taxpayer converts non-business property into property devoted to the production of revenue. He is then entitled to treat the transaction as one entered
into for profit from the time of the conversion, despite an original acquisition of the property
for non-profit motives. Heiner v. Tindle, 276 U.S. 582 (1928); cf. Leland Hazard, 7 T.C. 372
(1946).
3s Evans v. Rothensies, 114 F. 2d 958 (C.C.A. 3d, i94o); Com'r of Int. Rev. v. Ehrhart,
82 F. 2d 338 (C.C.A. 5th, 1936).
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reasonably can be inferred from acquisition of such property. It is doubtful,
however, whether the transaction in the McAllister case falls within this category. The life income interest, unlike the underlying asset out of which it was
derived, was not ordinary investment property. The trust instrument is evidence that this interest, rather than being created for business purposes, was
designed to provide the income beneficiary with an assurance of regularity in
income payments and freedom from business and investment responsibilities.36
The Sectior 23(e)(2) provision regarding losses in transactions entered into
for profit has also been construed to apply where property sold at a loss was
acquired by the seller with an intent to dispose of it at a profit. The acquisition
of property which is as non-commercial and generally unsalable as the income
interest in a trust is inconsistent with any resale profit motive. Loss deductions
claimed upon sales of annuities are not allowed, since the non-commercial nature
of a sale of an annuity precludes, in the absence of contrary evidence, an inference that ownership was for profit reasons. 3 If the owner of an annuity acquired
through investment of his capital is not treated as having a profit motive, it is
improbable that the owner of a life income interest, acquired through inheritance, will be accorded the benefit of such a motive. In the McAllister case
the trust instrument expressly made the taxpayer's interest inalienable. It is
improbable that the testator created, or the taxpayer accepted, that interest
with the intent that the taxpayer should profit by a future alienation. Even
,if surrender to the remainderman were contemplated, it is neither likely that the
testator would have intended the income beneficiary to profit at the remainderman's expense, nor reasonable for the beneficiary to claim that she accepted
benefits under the trust for the purpose of later destroying the testator's plan of
distribution.
A possible related contention is that the testator originally acquired the trust
corpus as part of a transaction entered into for profit, and the taxpayer is entitled to the benefit of that profit motive in order to come under Section
23 (e) (2).

A similar argument was made in the Laurence Arnold Tanzer case,38
which involved the sale of stock acquired by the seller as a gift. The court in
that case reasoned that since a donee acquires the basis of his donor for the
purpose of computing gain or loss upon a sale, Congress must have intended all
other tax aspects of the sale to refer back to the time of the donor's acquisition.
Thus a profit motive attending the donor's acquisition of the property was
imputed to the donee even though the donee could not establish that a similar
motive accompanied his acquisition of the property. Although the case involved
the gift and subsequent sale of an undivided property interest, it might be
36 Industrial Trust Co. v. Broderick, 4 F. 2d 927 (C.C.A. 5th, 1938), cert. den. 304 U.S.
572 (1938); See Evans v. Rothensies, 114 F. 2d 958, 961 (C.C.A. 3 d, 194o).
37 Evans v. Rothensies, 114 F. 2d 958 (C.C.A. 3 d, r94o); Industrial Trust Co. v. Broderick,
94 F. 2d 927 (C.C.A. 5th, 1938), cert. den. 304 U.S. 572 (1938); Helvering v. Louis, 77 F. 2d
386 (App. D.C., 1935).
3 37 B.T.A. 244 (I938).
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argued that the same reasoning should enable the life beneficiary of a trust acquired by gift to take advantage of his donor's profit motive. But if Congress,
by requiring a donee to use the basis of his donor, intended the donee to have
the benefit of the donor's profit motive, then it can as well be urged that a
beneficiary under a will, who acquires a new basis for computing gain and loss,
cannot relate any tax consequences back to the testator's acquisition of the
property, since Congress by requiring a new basis also required a new profit
motive.
It appears that the taxpayer in the McCallister case would have difficulty in
demonstrating that the surrender of her life income interest was part of a
transaction entered into for profit. The court did not consider this aspect of the
problem. Had it done so, there is at least good reason to doubt whether the taxpayer would have been entitled to a loss deduction as a result of the surrender
of her interest.
Labor Law-Injunctions-Picketing That Prevents Performance of Statutory Duty Owed Stranger to Dispute Non-Enjoinable-[New York].-A nonunion builder was in the process of constructing homes on a tract of land to
which there was only one entrance from the public highway. The defendant, a
building and construction union, called a strike of the union men employed on
the project when the builder refused to recognize or bargain with the union. One
month after picketing had begun at the only public entrance, the plaintiff purchased one of the homes which had been completed except for the installation
of gas and electricity. The co-defendant, a lighting company, in compliance
with a statutory duty,' sent some men to install these services in the plaintiff's
home among others. However, these employees, members of a sister union, refused to cross the defendant union's picket line. The plaintiff sought an order to
compel the lighting company to perform its statutory duty and to enjoin the
union from picketing in such a way as to prevent the performance of the statutory duty. The New York lower court granted a temporary injunction which
was reversed by the Appellate Division. On appeal to the New York Court of
Appeals, held, the New York little Norris La-Guardia Act2 prohibits the issuance
of any injunction "in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute" in
the absence of findings of fact which are not present in this case. Judgment
affirmed, three justices dissenting. Schivera v. Long IslandLighting Co.3
May a third party who has suffered an injury arising out of a labor dispute to
which he was not a disputant obtain an injunction when the injury stems from
the violation of an express statutory duty?
Tfie plaintiff contended that he was not a party to a labor dispute within the
I N.Y. Transportation Corporation Law (McKinney, 1943) c. 63, § 12.
2 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Ann. (Cahill, 1946), § 876-a.
3 296

N.Y. 26, 69 N.E. 2d 233 (1946).

